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**LEADERSHIP FROM THE CENTRE: A NEW FOREIGN
AND SECURITY POLICY FOR GERMANY**

by

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**LEADERSHIP FROM THE CENTRE: A NEW FOREIGN AND SECURITY
POLICY FOR GERMANY**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Germany in 2016 finds itself in the midst of a political and diplomatic revolution, the meaning of which is unclear for United States policy other than this process constitutes a break with custom and tradition in statecraft. This thesis analyzes the evolution of German foreign policy and security policy since revival of statecraft in 1945 and the changes in policy determinants since 1990. This evolution can be separated into phases beginning with the policy of reconciliation associated with the birth of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 culminating with the reunification of Germany in 1990. Having achieved the goals of reconciliation—regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, and achieving reunification, the determinants of the security policy shifted as Germany's relative geographic and diplomatic position in Europe shift during NATO and EU expansion. This led to policy eventually evolving into a focused effort towards European integration and ultimately—as the new generation of Germans raised under the peace and economic success after reunification—becoming a civilian power. Emerging from this period, a new Germany confident enough to declare leadership from the centre assumed *de facto* leadership in the European Union. The dichotomy of Germany's past and ambitions in foreign and security policy and the effects of its shifting geographic position within Europe are the key drivers of foreign policy.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CDU	Christian Democratic Union (German: <i>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</i>)
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DOD	United States Department of Defense
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
FDP	Free Democratic Party (German: <i>Freie Demokratische Partei</i>)
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NVA	National People's Army (German: <i>Nationale Volksarmee</i>)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SPD	Social Democratic Party (German: <i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i>)
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Munich Security Conference of 2015 took place during the Ukraine crisis, the heating up of the migrant crisis, and the Eurozone economic crisis in Greece. In each of these crises, Germany, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel, assumed a leadership role in management of the crisis. During the 2015 Munich Security Conference, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, the German Minister of Defence, suggested that Germany is ready to “lead from the centre.”¹ Leadership from the centre can mean many things for Germany, but the essence is a recognition by the elite of the German government that they must have the will and the capability to support their foreign security policy aims amidst a rapidly changing Europe and the international system.² While this statement taken at face value sounds to be a bold change in German foreign and security policy, certain observers commented on the speech and dismissed it as political rhetoric.³

The statement came as a response to the opening article of the 2015 Munich Security Report titled “Germany: Ready to Lead?” which was distributed as a conversation starter for the conference.⁴ The pressure for Germany to act more on the international stage did not originate from foreign commentators but from the German leadership during the 2014 Munich Security Conference as well as the press of events of a singular nature. Speeches from leaders like Joachim Gauck, the German president, prompted that, “Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”⁵ The German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier echoed Gauck stating, “Germany must be ready for

¹ Ursula Von der Leyen, “Leadership from the Centre,” (speech, 51st Munich Security Conference, Munich, February 6, 2015).

² Von der Leyen, “Leadership from the Centre.”

³ Nina Werkhäuser, “To Lead or Not to Lead?,” *Deutsche Welle*, February 7, 2015, <http://dw.com/p/1EXdQ>.

⁴ “Germany: Ready To Lead?,” from *Munich Security Report 2015* (Munich: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2015), 10.

⁵ *Munich Security Report 2015*, 10.

earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy sphere,” concluding that, “indifference is not an option for Germany.”⁶

Dr. Von der Leyen’s 2015 speech at the security conference stated that leadership from the centre means “to contribute one’s best resources and capabilities to alliances and partnerships,” “to enable others with less resources to make their vital contributions as equal partners,” and “to make others fit to assume responsibility for security in their own regions.” She added that,

the unconditional willingness to analyse and make decisions in a common approach—the willingness to create a common legitimacy, also in the form of new partnerships, for a commitment that in a globalised world no longer has any geographical limits: No nation—whatever its size— to successfully and permanently resolve conflicts on its own.⁷

A closer look at these statements reveals more than just political rhetoric, but instead, it announces to the world that Germany recognizes that it has to assume more responsibility in maintaining global security in the new world order.

The traditional guarantor of European security since the close of World War II (WWII), the United States, has since September 11, 2001, shifted more of its focus to the Middle East. Even before the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Defense (DOD) gave more attention to the Middle East, and since 1990, the Middle East has become the main region of the American military effort. At the same time this left Germany, with unity in that year, to prosper in a unified and peaceful Europe devoted to trade, sustainability, and life-style in which strife was a problem for someone else. Germany grew into its new role in the past decade for many reasons but partially because of the lack of interest in the United States concerning the security of Europe. The United States government has since announced in 2011 a plan—the so called “Pacific pivot”—to realign its statecraft and military forces to a new region of increasing strategic importance. In this vacuum of security leadership in Europe, Germany has emerged onto

⁶ *Munich Security Report 2015*, 10.

⁷ Von der Leyen, “Leadership.”

the international scene to take the reins in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine with the assistance of France.

The English-speaking world responded in 1989 and 1990 with fear about a revival of German power in national unity. While many of these dire predictions have proven to be exaggerations—especially those that predicted nuclear ambitions—the observers did recognize that a reunited Germany would transform the order of nations in Europe just as it had done under Bismarck. As this document is being written in 2016, Germany finds itself in the midst of a political and diplomatic revolution the meaning of which is unclear for US policy other than this process constitutes a break with custom and tradition in statecraft. Beginning in 1945, German foreign and security policy centered on the politics of reconciliation with the goals of regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, and ultimately achieving reunification. A change in security policy began shortly after reunification as Germany realized all the goals of the policy of reconciliation. Germany evolved into a civilian power centering its security policy on promoting the rule of law and building economic integration. Germany again succeeded in achieving its foreign and security policy goals gaining more power—eclipsing both the United Kingdom and France—to become the lead nation in Europe.

Thus, urgent is knowledge as to when and how did Germany step into the leadership role in the EU? How is Germany preparing to be a power capable of “leading from the centre”? What considerations are influencing the new German approach to foreign policy? Should the rest of Europe and the United States be concerned with Germany’s rise in power or support it?

Luigi Barzini in his travelogue, *The Europeans*, reflects that everyone dealing in Europe has had and always will need to better understand the “Mutable Germans”:

It is therefore once again essential for everybody, the French, the British, the Italians, the other Europeans, as well as the Americans and the Soviets, to keep an eye across the Rhine and the Alps and the Elbe in order to figure out, as our fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, the ancient Romans, and remote ancestors had to do, who the Germans are, who they

think they are, what they they're doing, and where they will go next, wittingly or unwittingly.⁸

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The major research questions to be answered are as follows: What are the character and causes for continuity as well as change in the German security and defense policy since German reunification and the end of the Cold War? As the security situation in Europe has evolved in the wake of the terrorists attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, how has the German government adapted to meet new security and defense challenges? What is the driving force behind Germany's desire to assume more responsibility for European Security?

To answer the questions, this thesis will build the foundation of West German security and defence policy leading up to reunification and will investigate how German security and defense policy has evolved since reunification, examining the external triggers, domestic constraints, and the stated foreign policy aims gathered relevant sources. The thesis will also break down leadership from the centre and determine whether this represents a new course for German security and defence policy. This thesis will also evaluate German foreign policy decisions since unification and whether the decisions led to the security and defense goals being met or were at least in line with the stated goals.

B. IMPORTANCE

The driving forces behind Germany's foreign policy are evolving, and as they evolve, the relationship with other countries—including the United States—must also evolve. The government of Germany is no longer held captive by the guilt of the Holocaust or the constraints of the Cold War division. Since 1990, a reunified Germany has quickly evolved from the beaten nation geographically situated at the edge of Western Europe to a nation that is both diplomatically and geographically at the center of

⁸ Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 69. Admittedly, Barzini's reflection of the Germans is not well developed, but his recognition of the central importance of Germany in European affairs is well founded.

Europe. Germany has regained its status as a great power alongside the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan.⁹

Germany has already demonstrated its desire to lead in Europe. The most recent foreign policy crises in Europe caused Germany to assume a de facto leadership role driving European Union policy. Once firmly planted in this role, Germany has not relented or wavered in its new leadership role but instead announced that Germany is ready to lead. Germany's size and economic power will continue to place Germany in the leadership role within the European Union for years to come, and this shift in the balance of power must be met respectively by other nations dealing with Europe.

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Germany wants to take a larger leadership role on the world stage. The external forces explained by realism and the responsibilities of the "Leadership from the Centre" policy will require a more capable Bundeswehr in addition to the civilian and economic power Germany already possesses. In order to attain this goal, the government will need to socially construct domestic support for military while respecting the culture of atonement. Germany will continue to want to act militarily within a coalition—preferably within the European Union—but also in NATO as required to support its foreign policy ambitions. However, as the Americans pivot to the Pacific and tensions with Russia continue to rise, Germany will have to assume a more military role to advance its foreign policy.

Many academics believe that a culture of atonement and the lessons of defeat are potential causes for the past resistance to the operational use of the Bundeswehr. The foreign policy of reconciliation best describes the reasons why Germany has sought to abstain from military operations from the end of WWII to unification. The external triggers and concerns over the current security situation in Europe have led to a change in conduct of the German foreign policy. While German foreign policy has not become more militaristic per se, the de facto leadership role of the foreign policy of the EU

⁹ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations* 10th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2014), 54.

concerning the Ukraine crisis requires a strong military capability to support the foreign policy goals. The German legacy of “*Nie wieder Krieg, Nie wieder Auschwitz!*” has led the Bundeswehr to seek to operate only within a coalition. The strong support for NATO, CSDP, and a possible European Army are evidence of this support. But as the Germans realize that the limitations of the EU security arrangement, and they begin to shift away from transatlantic security, a focus on providing more support for the Bundeswehr will move more to the front of German security and defense policy debates.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis will source mainly scholarly works and news articles with a few case studies to support main themes of change and continuity of German foreign policy. The thesis will answer the research questions by comparing Germany’s stated security and defense policy aims using primary sources and news articles relating events and statements along with scholarly analysis to find trends and patterns since unification that may clarify the present-day foreign policy goals. The literature review will look at a broad cross-section of disciplines—including history, geopolitics, and international relations theory—to narrow in on the key determinants of German foreign policy goals. The thesis will use sources in English and German, including comparisons of different points of view from diverse countries in order to gain a wide spectrum of perspectives concerning Germany’s foreign policy. A review of the 1994 and the 2006 White Papers will also shed important trends and changes in the foreign policy goals in respect to security policy. The thesis will use a few case studies of military operations to evaluate public sentiment and political will and how they have evolved since unification. The case studies will provide support for statements and scholarly analysis.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE

The thesis will consist of five chapters. After an introduction, the second chapter, “Prelude to Reunification,” will examine the history of the original unification of Germany under Prussia in 1864-1871 as a basis for how a powerful Germany disrupted the delicate balance of power in Europe. For reasons of compactness as well as the urgency of the moment, the period between World War I and the surrender of Nazi

Germany in 1945 is largely absent from this thesis. Instead, the focus in this chapter will be on the foreign and security policy of reconciliation adopted by the Bonn government, and how it shaped public and international perception about Germany's place in international affairs. The chapter will address the conflicting while also complementing policies of *Westbindung*—western orientation—and *Ostpolitik*—eastern policy. The chapter will also examine acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO and the path to regaining sovereignty, security, and reunification as a means to develop a starting point for a new united Germany.

The third chapter—"Reunification and the Rise of the Civilian Power"—will evaluate German statecraft of the 1990s. The chapter will also include an analysis of the realist predictions of a reunited Germany and a brief summary of a German foreign policy dominated by realist motives—including requests for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and nuclear weapons—and why these predictions never came to fruition. Using scholarly analysis and primary source statements, the chapter will evaluate German support for the integration of the EU and the rise to civilian power. The chapter will use events such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Balkan Wars (1993-1999), and NATO/EU enlargement to support the theme of the rise to civilian power status. The chapter will also lay out the key themes of the evolution of the policy of reconciliation.

The third chapter—"The Emerging Great Power"—will evaluate Germany's continued support for EU integration, especially surrounding the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the European Union (EU) army. This chapter will briefly evaluate case studies of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), Iraq War (2003), and Libya (2011) to support the observation of the Germany government's increasing autonomy of action in foreign policy. This chapter will also evaluate the shift within the German government to pursue a more realist foreign policy using geo-economic power to advance its interests in the EU. The chapter will also highlight the division of the German government's global ambitions and the lack of domestic support. The chapter will also evaluate the German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen's statements from the Munich Security Conferences (2014-15) and her statements about security and defense policy and the Bundeswehr.

The fifth chapter—"Conclusion"—will assess the evolution of Germany's security and defense policy since unification and compare patterns and trend against the initial predictions of the realist theory of international relations. This chapter will also summarize the evolution of Germany's integration in the EU and rise to civilian power then to geo-economic power and to now—as a normal, confident middle power emerging as a great power. The chapter will consider how geopolitical realities will contend with the political ambitions of the German government. The conclusion will also assess the impact of a more powerful Germany—ready to lead from the centre—has on the current world order.

II. THE PRELUDE TO REUNIFICATION: POLICY OF RECONCILIATION

This chapter examines the record of the 1864-1871 unification of Germany under Prussia. This event led to the emergence of a powerful Germany that disrupted the European order since 1815. Further, this chapter highlights what is called *die deutsche Mittellage*—Germany’s central position in the map of the European continent—to understand the basic geopolitical considerations that remain true today when analyzing German security and defense policy. In his contemporary reprise of geopolitics that quotes from Bismarck, Robert Kaplan observes that, “Precisely because they have occupied the center of Europe as a land power, Germans have always demonstrated a keen awareness of geography and strategy as a survival mechanism.”¹⁰

Though a review of the period between World War I—including the Weimar Republic—and the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 are largely absent from this thesis. This is not because it is not important to the German story, but this author can assume that these events are so well known as to be generalized, and the size of this thesis cannot accommodate a total history of modern Germany. Further, the weight of the German catastrophe—as it was formerly called in the wake of 1945—the Federal Republic has consciously attempted to break with the statecraft of 1871 until 1945 that ended in this disaster. The collective memories of the Holocaust and the Nazi atrocities during the war do play heavily in the aftermath following the surrender in 1945, and the influence that these collective memories have on foreign and security policy are more important to this thesis.

Beginning in 1945, West German foreign and security policy centered on the politics of reconciliation at first with the western powers and, later, with the Soviet realm with the goals of regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, and ultimately achieving reunification. This policy shaped domestic and international perceptions about post-World War II Germany’s place in the world, and eventually, the policy allowed a united

¹⁰ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2012), 15.

Germany to return to influence international affairs and a position of respect in the family of nations. The West German government's steadfast support of multilateralism and increasing integration in European institutions and NATO are examples of how these processes served to support reconciliation by reassuring the Western nations that Germany no longer represented a threat to the hard won peace.¹¹ The decision to rearm the FRG in the mid-1950s and the its role as a key piece of NATO's Western European collective security allowed the FRG to regain important aspects of national sovereignty. The chapter will also address the conflicting—while also complementary—reconciliation policies of *Westbindung* and *Ostpolitik* adopted as part of the path to reunification from the middle 1960s until 1989 to develop a starting point for the security and defense policies of a united Germany. Although important to a larger examination of security policy, this thesis does not examine the policies of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) because the most continuity can be found between the policies of the FRG across time before and after reunification.

A. BISMARCK AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

The epoch of peace in Europe after 1945, the rapid democratization of Central Europe after 1990, and the increased globalization of capitalism that further economically integrated the world economies created a wave of optimism that led the now Stanford professor, Francis Fukuyama, to declare “the end of history.”¹² From the perspective of the crisis in the year 2016, a certain irony adheres to this now quaint idea, whereby an understanding of the story of Germany's role in the European system of states in the classical period is in order. The term “balance of power” had—until recently—become sort of taboo when describing the geopolitical situation in now peaceful and integrated Europe. The use of the phrase balance of power to describe the politics in Europe may have passed out of fashion in contemporary times as the focus on European integration and the spread of liberal democratic ideals became the dominant drivers of German

¹¹ Claus Hofhansel, *Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy, and Central Europe*. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 16.

¹² Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), 10.

foreign policy of the past quarter century. However, the theory behind the importance of balance of power politics has endured despite the declining popularity of the term.¹³

Robert Kaplan states that the spread of democracy does not portend that nations' foreign policies will become more enlightened than the dictatorships they replaced.¹⁴ The specter of the balance of power politics from the 17th century until the Cold War still haunts international power politics today. The notable international relations theorist, Hans Morgenthau, elaborates on this principle:

The balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable, but an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle, but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign states.¹⁵

It is important to understand the effect that a powerful united Germany has had on the international system of states in Europe, where the balance of power politics emerged in the 18th century as a principle of statecraft. To illustrate this conclusion, one easily reflects back on the birth of the mid-19th century balance of power, and the consequence that the 1866–1871 consolidation of the many fragmented Germanic kingdoms under Prussia had on Europe. When Otto von Bismarck took the appointment of minister-president of Prussia in 1862, there was no nation state of Germany but the post 1815 and post 1848 duality between Berlin and Vienna.¹⁶ At that time, “Germany” was a loosely tied together political organization—called the German Confederation—set up at Vienna in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815.¹⁷

When compared against the enormous land empire of Russia or the great naval power of Great Britain, the kingdom of Prussia was a relatively small nation that could

¹³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated edition, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), 341.

¹⁴ Kaplan, *Revenge*, 25.

¹⁵ Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knopf; [distributed by Random House, 1972), 125.

¹⁶ Donald Abenheim, Associate Professor of European Security at Naval Postgraduate School, in discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

¹⁷ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 289.

barely be considered among the great powers in Europe. However, its key role in the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo under General Blücher won it great power status as one of the five guarantors of the peace outlined in the Treaties of Paris (1814-15).¹⁸ The 1817 Treaty at Chaumont introduced the term *great power*, as post-Napoleonic Europe recognized Prussia as one of the great powers of the time.¹⁹

Bismarck—an instinctive *Realpolitiker*—recognized that a nation's power was measured by both its actual and potential military and economic strength and its reputation.²⁰ With an eye to the order constructed in absolutism and further codified in Metternich's time, he understood the path to power for the Prussian Empire was to unite the Germanic kingdoms under a single *Reich* without the Hapsburgs. The order of nations created by the Congress of Vienna led to the consolidation of a plethora of Germanic kingdoms into around thirty German-speaking states.²¹ The Revolutions of 1848—with the revival of nationalism and liberalism broken free from the bonds put on it by Metternich and the Holy Alliance in 1815—captured the rising spirit of nationalism amongst the Germanic people. Bismarck sought to capitalize on the sentimentalities for the benefit of Prussia. The unification process began in earnest in 1864. Austria and Prussia united to attack Denmark for the German speaking duchies of Holstein and Schleswig. Soon after, Bismarck, unhappy with Austria concerning the new acquisitions the German Confederation, perceived the weakness of the Austrian Empire and sought to seize on the opportunity to expand Prussian power. The culmination of the Austrian War of 1866 was the amalgamation of many of these fragmented kingdoms into the Northern German Confederation under Prussia, thus, paving the way for further consolidation of the Germanic world under Prussian control.²²

¹⁸ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 289.

¹⁹ Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security in the Twenty-first Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 37.

²⁰ Gordon Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer: Aspects of German Statecraft*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), 25. The term *Realpolitiker* is attributed to Ludwig von Rochow in the 1850s.

²¹ Hans Kundnani, *The Paradox of German Power*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7.

²² Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 291.

With the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71 Germany emerged in a dominant role in the European system, which had not been the case in the previous chapters of the balance since 1648. Undoing what Louis XIV had done, Bismarck regained the coveted territories of the Alsace-Lorraine extending the border of Germany from the Rhine to the Vosges mountains to secure the Reich in the west.²³ The war also united the other princely houses creating the Second Reich as a modern German nation state. The rise of German power and the decline of France grossly revised the precarious balance of power in Europe built on the Congress of Vienna following the Napoleonic Wars with Bismarck's Europe in which France was isolated and Habsburg and Romanov were tied, at least for a while, to Berlin.²⁴ The British Prime Minister at the time, Benjamin Disraeli, declared in a speech to the House of Commons in 1871, "This war represents the German Revolution...a greater political event than the French Revolution...you have a new world...the balance of power has been entirely destroyed."²⁵ The years following Bismarck's death proved that the complex balance of power in Europe required a statesman of Bismarck's talent. Craig claims that the "nervousness and maladroitness" of German foreign policy after Bismarck from 1888 until 1914 left Europe much more unstable and fragile.²⁶

These events reflected how the geographic position—termed *Mittellage*—in the center of Europe has governed German international relations. Friedrich Ratzel, an influential German scholar of geopolitics in the late-19th century, spoke of the so-called *conditio Germanae*—or curse of the central position—meant that a weak Germany would be the battleground of the great powers, but a strong Germany that dominated the coveted *Mitteleuropa* (European Heartland) could secure adequate *Lebensraum* (living space) to

²³ Donald Abenheim, Associate Professor of European Security at Naval Postgraduate School, in discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

²⁴ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 7.

²⁵ Lothar Gall, *Bismarck: The White Revolutionary*, vol. 1, 1815-1871, trans. J.A. Underwood, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1986), 40-1.

²⁶ Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 35.

become a *Grossmacht* (great power) in its own right.²⁷ The foreign policy of Bismarck emerged from these geopolitical limits in freedom it faced. In order to increase its own security in the European order with the possibility of French revenge for 1870, the Prussian and then the Second Reich's focused its foreign policy on the European heartland.²⁸

Gordon Craig notes that—in contrast to Britain, France and Italy—Bismarck was constrained from participating in “adventures in exotic and exciting areas remote from the nation’s main sphere of influence.”²⁹ In the age of imperialism in the 1880s, Bismarck himself remarked to those who believed that Germany should look for colonies, “Your map of Africa is very beautiful, but my map of Africa is in Europe. Here is Russia and here is France, and here we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa.”³⁰ The statement reflects an important observation—since the beginning, Germany’s vulnerable position in the center of Europe and its continental orientation have been a core of its foreign policy, and this fact remains true even today in a globalized world of interlocking crises and German and European interest in the global economy. This glance back at the unification of Germany in the 19th century helps to build a foundation for the importance to security policy of the geopolitical realities of Germany’s central location in Europe. Germany’s position has historically focused its foreign policy on the European heartland, and it has reduced the importance of foreign policy foci outside of the European continent. Bismarck’s map of Africa is still valid today.

B. INTEGRATION AND MULTILATERALISM FOR SOVEREIGNTY

The Second World War had claimed the lives of at least 17 million combatants killed in action and at least 18 million non-combatants.³¹ The destruction of six long years of total war left most of Europe in ruins. The Columbia University historian, Mark

²⁷ Geoffrey Parker, *Geopolitics: Past, Present and Future* (London ; Washington: Pinter, 1998), 17. Ratzel’s thesis is summarized in detail by Parker.

²⁸ Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer*, 25.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid, 24.

³¹ Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 87.

Mazower explains that, “not surprisingly, feelings of intense bitterness and ‘morbid hatred’ against the Germans were widespread when the war ended.”³² The discovery of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, and the birth of the atomic age left little faith in the ability of Europe to maintain a peaceable existence for the future. The lessons drawn from the war were that the victors must create a new world order for a chance of peace. The result was that, in the midst of the war, President Roosevelt—with the agreements of Churchill and Stalin—ordered the unconditional surrender and enduring punishment of the offending nations, and thus, created a new world system to keep order in the post war world.³³

The result for Germany was the division and occupation of the country by the winning allied powers—the United States, France, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Famine, uncertainty, millions of Germans expelled from other nations, the crimes against humanity, and genocide filled the immediate years after the defeat. The Allies adopted a policy of de-Nazification though the process took different forms on each side of divided Germany. De-Nazification included both trials for war crimes and reeducation programs for German youth. As part of the consequences of the de-Nazification effort, the Allies forced the German people to repudiate their anti-democratic and militaristic past and to reevaluate their present. The results were recognition of the victims and an acceptance of the guilt for the Nazi atrocities.³⁴

The Christian Democratic former mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer assumed the Chancellery in Bonn in 1949 of an occupied West German state with limited sovereignty. The Allies divided Germany into east and west, and these two states became organized as the Cold War deepened in 1948-1949 in the middle of Europe. Adenauer accepted the truth that the path to sovereignty for the West Germans was through reconciliation first with the Western Allies and to integrate West Germany into the cause

³² Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, (New York: Vintage, 1998), 216.

³³ Mazower, *Dark*, 88.

³⁴ Steven M. Schroeder, *To Forget It All and Begin Anew: Reconciliation in Occupied Germany*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 40.

of western European and Atlantic unity.³⁵ Adenauer's goal was the so-called *Westbindung*, unfulfilled in the Weimar Republic by Gustav Stresemann, as the answer to national weakness and division.³⁶ A policy of strength with the west would lead to national unity when the Soviets retreated from their over-extended position on the Elbe. Eventually, during the détente from the late 1960s until the middle 1970s the conditions in the Cold War would allow a chance for reconciliation with the eastern nations as well.

The policy of reconciliation that dominated the West German foreign and security policy had three main goals—regaining sovereignty, attaining security, and eventual reunification of Germany. The political scientist Claus Hofhansel declares, “in 1949 Federal Republic was not a sovereign or even a semisovereign state but an occupied country.”³⁷ Regaining this sovereignty was Adenauer primary concern, and he understood that sovereignty could only be won through a comprehensive policy of reconciliation including integration with the Western nations. The Allied Occupation Statute promised Germany “the maximum possible degree” of self-government, but the allies were constantly pressuring the fledgling government concerning policy—especially about issues of reparations and reconciliation with victims of Nazi war crimes.³⁸ These issues of reconciliation influenced heavily in the questions of a return of German sovereignty or furthering integration with the Western Allies—both central goals at the time.³⁹

The goals of regaining sovereignty and attaining security happened to coincide into an opportunity to advance both goals in the first decade of the FRG. The first order of business was to set Germany down the path to integrate increasingly in multilateral institutions in Europe to regain acceptance to the family of nations. Adenauer understood that to ever regain its sovereignty, the German government would have accept some

³⁵ Craig, *From Bismarck to Adenauer*, 137.

³⁶ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 28.

³⁷ Hofhansel, *Multilateralism*, 9.

³⁸ Schroeder, *Forget It All*, 131.

³⁹ *Ibid*, 131.

temporary restraints to that sovereignty.⁴⁰ The so-called *Westbindung*—or increasing integration with the West—policy assumed that to regain its sovereignty, the German government would have to reconcile primarily with France and the Benelux countries, and then demonstrate itself as a reliable partner to the other allies in collective defense with NATO.⁴¹ The first important step in this process of integration and multilateralism was the Schumann Plan and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)—the precursor of the European Union. The Schumann Plan was able to link the key industrial bases of a war economy with France providing both a measure of security for France and a vital industrial market for Germany. The importance of the Schumann Plan was beyond economics was that it increased West Germany's sovereignty by its status equal partner nation with France in the ECSC.⁴²

C. THE *REALPOLITIK* OF THE POST-WAR ORDER

The post-war security situation in Europe had also become an immediate concern for West Germany. Hopes for unity among the victors did not last, and relations between the Allies and the Soviet Union quickly began to deteriorate after 1945 as the conflict of democratic capitalism and authoritarian communism ideologies moved to the forefront of the new Cold War in international politics. From unification in 1871 to defeat in 1945, Germany had enjoyed a powerful position in the center of Europe.⁴³ Now the West Germans found themselves and the nation divided once more into parts as prior to 1871 and on the eastern edge of Western Europe. Their location placed the West Germans as the frontline bulwark against the Soviet Union's Red Army and spread of communism. The importance of West Germany's position geographically and ideologically on the strategic battlefield against communism was not lost on the United States—or on the newly formed West German government.

⁴⁰ Hofhansel, *Multilateralism*, 9.

⁴¹ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 28.

⁴² *Ibid*, 29.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 24.

The question of rearming West Germany became a central theme in early NATO politics and a key source of bargaining power for Konrad Adenauer, especially as the USSR created a new German army under cover in the Soviet Zone from 1948 until 1952.⁴⁴ The eventual plan required a West German commitment to raise the West German Army, the Bundeswehr, of 500,000 men, and in return, Adenauer had secured a full membership status in a European Defense Community (EDC) as well as NATO and a restoration of much of the lost sovereignty of West Germany back to the German government.⁴⁵ The new nation manifested the pain of national division behind the plan of its chief figure, Konrad Adenauer—to integrate the Rhine Republic into the western community and to engage national unity from an eventual roll back of communist power in Central Europe. This task required association with the emerging Atlantic alliance, that is, NATO, founded one month before the FRG in April 1949. At its inception, the mission of NATO, as famously attributed to the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”⁴⁶ Alternatively, more appropriately put, NATO’s original strategy focused on the stability and collective defense of Western Europe against Soviet Union (USSR) with the integration of West Germany with the Western nations buttressed by an enduring US defense commitment.⁴⁷

Politically the decision to arm the FRG and to join the EDC and NATO was obviously positive and necessary, but Adenauer faced strong criticism from the German people who were wary of war and militarism with very good reason. The policy reconciliation developed domestically into an antimilitaristic approach to security and defense policy. Starting what would become a trend of dissention between the general German public and the ambitions of the government, a poll conducted in 1950 found the 67% of those polled were against rearmament or to service in the military.⁴⁸ In order to

⁴⁴ Abenheim, discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

⁴⁵ John A. Reed, Jr., *Germany and NATO*, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987), 35.

⁴⁶ Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy: U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 134.

⁴⁷ Hofhansel, *Multilateralism*, 9.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 57.

promote the idea of a new army on a constitutional basis for those who had been abused in the Wehrmacht as well as to solve longstanding problems of checks and balances in statecraft —the Bundeswehr developed under a concept of civilian in uniform approach to military leadership or *Innere Führung*.⁴⁹

Through the efforts of all the Alliance members, NATO successfully achieved its stated goals in Germany until unity in 1990. After the destruction of World War II, the full participation of the United States on an enduring basis was critical to ensure stability in the fragile continent of Europe. To this end, the United States maintained a commitment of around 250,000 troops in West Germany for nearly four decades as well as forces elsewhere.⁵⁰ US military leadership of NATO was a balancing force to the nationalistic politics that contributed to the causes of two world wars, an occupation that John Mearsheimer refers to as an “offshore balancer.”⁵¹

Although not a founding member of NATO in 1949, West Germany found a place as an equal partner under the Alliance security umbrella after five years of diplomatic struggle. NATO integrated West Germany into the defense structure from 1955 until 1965, and quickly became the bulwark of the forward defense in Western Europe.⁵² The separation of Germany into East and West and the eventual building of the Berlin Wall in 1961 became the physical representation of Churchill’s Iron Curtain—the symbolic dividing line of the Cold War.⁵³

Rather than keeping the Germans down, NATO allowed West Germany to fully participate as a member of the alliance. German participation in NATO evolved as the strategic vision of NATO has been redefined throughout the decades. During the Cold

⁴⁹ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 44-5.

⁵⁰ Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003,” Heritage Foundation Center for Data Analysis Report #04-11 on National Security and Defense, October 27, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.

⁵¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, updated ed., (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), 255.

⁵² David S. Yost, “Transatlantic Relations and Peace in Europe,” *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol. 78, No. 2 (Apr. 2002), 298.

⁵³ Winston S. Churchill, “Iron Curtain Speech,” March 5, 1946, Fordham University, Accessed on March 15, 2016 <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/churchill-iron.asp>.

War, West Germany was strategically positioned on the front lines of the NATO defense. NATO's collective defense role allowed Germany to rearm and maintain a sizeable military presence without violating the provisions of self-defense enshrined in the Basic Law. The nature of the NATO alliance supported a defensive only role for Germany. This allowed the German military to rearm under conditions contained by the strength of the NATO allies, mainly the United States.

The third goal of the policy of reconciliation was ultimately to achieve the reunification of West and East Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany was officially founded in 1949 with the ratification of the temporary Basic Law—and in the preamble the goal of reunification of Germany is implied by stating that this is a “transitional period,” and that the Basic Law is “acted also on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied,” namely the East Germans.⁵⁴ The Basic Law survived reunification, as envisioned in Article 146 and remains in effect today.⁵⁵ The policy of reconciliation included an understanding that amends would not only have to occur with the western nations but also with the nations on the other side of the Iron Curtain—especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union—if the goal of reunification was ever to be realized.

Once the period of *Westbindung* gave way to détente in the 1960s, the enduring symbol of German reconciliation in Eastern Europe is the vision of German Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeling before the monument for the victim of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising on December 7, 1970.⁵⁶ The picture embodied the détente policies between the United States and the Soviet Union that opened the door for Brandt's easing of tensions with the Central European Soviet bloc governments or *Ostpolitik*.⁵⁷ The *Ostpolitik* during the détente laid the groundwork that would by the 1980s pave the way for the merger of

⁵⁴ Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, May 23, 1949, Accessed on http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1999/1/1/7fa618bb-604e-4980-b667-76bf0cd0dd9b/publishable_en.pdf.

⁵⁵ Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, November 2012, https://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf.

⁵⁶ Hofhansel, *Multilateralism*, 2.

⁵⁷ Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 117.

equals of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany. Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was a realist shift to step back from nuclear holocaust and to normalize relations with Central Europe. It also represented a change away from the idealistic refusal of the Adenauer government to deal with other Central European nations.⁵⁸

A consequence of Adenauer's insistence on Western integration, especially the armament of the FRG, was the deepening division of West and East Germany, just as the GDR embarked on a Stalinist course even without Stalin. West Germany's commitment to NATO intertwined with the goals of NATO Atlantic Strategy, although a divergence of interest operates as well, especially from the perspective of Bonn. Until then, the Federal Republic of Germany essentially united—with frictions along the way in the Eisenhower era—with NATO policies. However, the unity of policies began to fray with the nuclear stalemate at the end of the 1950s.

In, and by August 1961, the division of Berlin by the Berlin Wall became the symbol of the struggle for mastery in Europe. The reconciliation of World War II atrocities carried on as Germany had to address claims with Central European countries—especially with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Brandt sought to shift the reconciliation policy to revise the Hallstein doctrine and find common ground with Central European nations of the Soviet bloc. The Adenauer government adopted the so-called Hallstein Doctrine—that the FRG was the sole Germany and the GDR was just the Soviet Zone—to delegitimize the division of Germany as part of a plan to achieve reunification. The goal of *Ostpolitik* after 1969 was also the eventual reunification of the two Germanys, but as a requirement to open up dialogue with the GDR, Brandt had officially to recognize the division of Germany and the sovereignty and borders of the Eastern European nations.⁵⁹

Germany's defeat and surrender to the Allies at the conclusion of WWII presented the German government and people with an opportunity to recreate a democratic nation,

⁵⁸ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 33.

⁵⁹ Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 120-1.

but there was no zero hour for the German people.⁶⁰ Lily Gardner Feldman, Senior Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University, notes that the central theme of German foreign policy after WWII was a political and moral process of progressive reconciliation, but that public opinion and the government were often divided on the proper approach to reconciliation.⁶¹ Germany had to atone for the physical and emotional damages forced on their victims after seven brutal years of death and destruction, but often the ambitions of political leaders like Adenauer and Brandt were far ahead of public opinions of reconciliation.⁶²

The post-heroic idealism of Chancellor Adenauer secured the Federal Republic of Germany's sovereignty in return for western integration, and the vision of Chancellor Brandt and the *Ostpolitik* that laid the foundation for the eventual reunification of Germany in 1990.⁶³ The result was a German nation that had integrated itself fully into multilateral institutions of collective defense and economic trade blocks. In addition to military security, the US funded Marshall Plan in 1947 provided the funding to economically rebuild the devastated continent. The strong US engagement in security over the decades helped to create the stable conditions that fostered increased European economic integration culminating in the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor to the European Union.⁶⁴ Germany's prosperity depended on enhancing trade relationships with the world and slowly earning readmission to the family of nations, especially in Europe.⁶⁵ By demonstrating its reliability as an equal partner, Germany also earned a level of respect in the international arena as a civilian power.⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 23.

⁶¹ Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation*, (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), 18.

⁶² Feldman, *Reconciliation*, 18.

⁶³ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 25.

⁶⁴ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), 62.

⁶⁵ Feldman, *Reconciliation*, 18.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 43.

III. REUNIFICATION AND THE RISE OF THE CIVILIAN POWER

The success of the policy of reconciliation allowed Germany to achieve the three primary foreign and security policy goals of maintaining security, regaining sovereignty, and ultimately, reunification. During the forty-five years since the defeat of Germany in 1945, the policy of reconciliation demonstrated to the world of Germany's commitment to the Kantian liberal ideologies of democracy, economic integration, and international institution, which earned Germany a respected reputation of peaceful diplomacy in the international community.⁶⁷ In the prelude to German unity in 1989–1990, not all were confident that a unified Germany would maintain its peaceful existence since the close of World War II. The reunification made Germany over night the most populous nation and the nation with the highest economic output in what would soon become the European Union—eclipsing both France and the United Kingdom. Certain scholars—as well as leading European leaders—believed that a united Germany would be incompatible with European unity.⁶⁸ There were even unfounded concerns among those more at home with theory than aware of the realities of war and peace in Central Europe that a new powerful Germany would seek to secure a nuclear arsenal of their own.⁶⁹ These beliefs were in line with how scholars believe great powers will behave under the widely cited international relations theory of realism.

The concept of realism expects that the international system will remain anarchic, that states will seek to increase their power, and that great powers will compete for power against other powers all in an effort to gain more security.⁷⁰ International relations theorists divide realism into defensive realism—the quest to gain more security—and offensive realism—the quest to gain more power. A united Germany had in the past been

⁶⁷ Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 197.

⁶⁸ Webber, *New Europe*, 5.

⁶⁹ John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer, 1990), 8.

⁷⁰ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 3.

held accountable as disrupter of the delicate balance of power and ultimately the cause of two devastating world wars. The German Question that once captured the concerns of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was again brought to the forefront of Europeans' minds.

In a view that was also widely held in Washington, DC at the time, realists scholars like University of Chicago political scientist and founder of offensive realism, John J. Mearsheimer, were concerned that a unified Germany would quickly rise to power and prove to be a destabilizing force in Europe. He believed that Germany would grasp nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer added that the future implied goal of NATO would continue as a means to provide security for Germany so that Germany would not be tempted to militarize further, and it recognizes that continued US engagement in Europe through NATO also provides security to the other NATO members from a possible resurgence of German power.⁷¹ This would become one of the unstated goals of the sustainment of NATO in Europe despite the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To the chagrin of realists like Mearsheimer, Germany in the 1990s more or less disarmed, reducing its forces in size to what today is too small a level and embracing a policy of NATO enlargement as the core of its defense policy that remained within NATO. The Bonn government in the 1990s maintained its campaign of multilateralism and centered its foreign and security policy on promoting the rule of law in the international system and building economic integration within, what after 1992, became the European Union. German commitment to multilateralism and a continued denunciation of the use of military power actually stabilized much of Central Europe during a potentially dangerous time of epic transformation. The new Germany continued most previous West German policies—including reconciliation with the emerging democratic governments of Central Europe. Germany was a strong supporter of increased European integration that would solidify the European Common Market into the European Union and eventually created a borderless Schengen Zone and a single currency area—the Eurozone.

⁷¹ Mearsheimer, *Future*, 5-6.

Germany's commitment to pacifism was tested when the continent was again haunted by genocide—this time in the former Yugoslavia. Germany desired to continually act within multinational security institutions like the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, but the re-emergence of ethnic conflict revealed that the EU was unable to respond appropriately without American military assistance. This realization of inadequacy and the growing sentiment in Europe to act with more freedom from US influence furthered the ambitious plan to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CSFP).⁷² Overtime, a change began in the determinants of Germany's foreign and security policy as the German government came to embrace its new position of power and began to express more freedom of political maneuver. This dichotomy of positioning for more freedom of maneuver outside of the American controlled Atlantic alliance and the lack of cohesion and a credible military force between the EU members has left Germany with little choice but to pursue a more independent foreign and security policy.⁷³

A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVILIAN POWER

Sebastian Harnisch, Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy at the University of Heidelberg, suggests that post-unification Germany pursued the path of a civilian power, which, according to Harnisch, seeks to gain a monopolization of force within collective security institutions and uses mainly non-violent means to achieve foreign policy aims.⁷⁴ However, Harnisch also interestingly notes that although Germany has sought peaceful means to achieve policy goals that does not mean that civilian powers are always successful or that they regularly promote 'good causes.'⁷⁵ Douglas Webber, Professor of Political Science at INSEAD, agrees and states that the Bonn government renounced military force as a method of advancing West German foreign

⁷² Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan: 2012), 243

⁷³ Ibid, 246.

⁷⁴ Sebastian Harnisch, "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy," in Douglas Webber, ed., *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2001), 37.

⁷⁵ Harnisch, "Change and Continuity," 35.

policy and that unified Germany initially maintained a defense only policy towards the use of military force. Nevertheless, as the Soviet Union fell, people's mixed collective memories could not forget the atrocities of World War II, and they were still wary of a powerful reunited Germany.⁷⁶

The Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, Hans Kundnani claims that Germany became a civilian power, which unlike a great power, seeks to influence international norms to "civilize" international relations.⁷⁷ Kundnani echoes the scholarship of Professor of International Relations at *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, Hanns Maull, who argued that Germany, like Japan, emerged from the defeat of World War II, as "a new type of international power" that embraces cooperation and economic means to advance its foreign policy goals.⁷⁸ The Germans were committed to a policy of increased use of a statecraft that came to be called civilian power and a pursuit of further integration with the other European nations.⁷⁹ This approach allowed Germany to grow in relative power without alarming its critics with militaristic visions from the past.

The new unified German government, in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to Europe, sought to strengthen relationships within the European Community. Amid the leadership of Chancellor (1982-1998) Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Foreign Minister (1974-1992) Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), the German government strongly supported the development of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Kohl set out to ease the fears of his allies by having Germany work within the framework of the EU, and working to align German foreign policy within the EU context.⁸⁰ The Germans

⁷⁶ Douglas Webber, *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2001), 5.

⁷⁷ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 25

⁷⁸ Ibid, 26.

⁷⁹ Helga A. Welsh, "Germany: Ascent to Middle Power," in *European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter*, Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren eds., (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 212.

⁸⁰ John Van Oudenaren, "The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor: Toward a New Realism," in *European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter*, Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudenaren eds., (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 22.

knew that only by working within a multilateral framework, backed by legitimized international support—like the UN—would the international community be less wary of a more powerful Germany.

Cold War Germany and Western Europe mainly found security under the NATO and US defense umbrella. Many external factors influenced the German attitude toward war and peace in the epoch of post-unification. The threat from the USSR represented a threat that could only be countered only by the military might of the United States, but the by December 1991, the USSR collapsed, and it was too entangled in the revolution of its own rebirth to represent a threat to NATO. By the end of 1991, the Gulf War had been fought and a war of Yugoslav succession was beginning, but these could be said to have minimal impact on German interests in that year.

Many believed that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new world order of liberal democracies that would create a lasting peace—the end of history according to Fukuyama.⁸¹ However, as the changing world order revealed that many crises emerged from “the permafrost of superpower confrontation.”⁸² This lacuna was especially evident as the ethnically driven conflict in Yugoslavia that manifested itself from 1991 onwards. The Germans hoped that they could navigate the post-Cold War security environment as a power with less military might but a good deal of civilian and economic power. The Germans embraced a concept of smart power combining diplomatic, cultural, and economic factors supported by a capable military that could be effectively wielded to enhance security. Smart power is a concept that combines both hard power—military power and economic sanctions—and soft power—the power of a nation’s culture to affect change.⁸³ A diplomatic solution to the Yugoslav war could not be reached by the European powers alone, and the only course of action was to execute a humanitarian mission to stop a potential genocide.

⁸¹ Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, 10.

⁸² Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 5.

⁸³ Joseph Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2009), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart?page=1>.

Germany knew that for the European Union to contribute to international security, it would still need a capable military force to support foreign policy. In the wake of the Cold War, the European Community wanted to establish itself as a credible political actor on the international stage.⁸⁴ The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 outlined the basic ideas behind the establishment of a more political European Union, and it laid the foundation for one of the key pillars—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The European Union wanted to tackle two important issues in the post-Cold War era. First, the EU wanted to establish a cohesive foreign policy that the Europeans could offer the international community. Second, the EU sought to prevent a possible security vacuum caused by the eventual reduction of United States forces in Europe the EU's willingness to assume a larger share of the burden for European security.⁸⁵

Alister Miskimmon, the Director of European Studies at the University of London, uses a theme of Europeanisation to explain the processes behind the development of EU foreign and security policy and by implication, the role of Germany in such a process. He noted that states that participate in the process both “upload” and “download” foreign and security policy constraints and objectives.⁸⁶ The member states then adapt their own foreign and security policies within these constraints and objectives. Thus further uploading, downloading, and adapting occur in a continuous feedback loop in the policy development. This cycle forces member states to balance carefully the external demands on the EU by the larger international community, the demands within the EU amongst member states, and the demands of their own constituents.⁸⁷ Within this context, Germany was able to use its growing power to influence policy in the European Union, which created an amplifying effect of downloaded German foreign policy goals advanced through the CFSP. Moreover, when the EU proved incongruent with German goals, Germany could still act bilaterally, as it has in its continued pursuit of bilateral

⁸⁴ Alister Miskimmon, *Germany and Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation*, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 48.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 45.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 46.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

relations that has prompted some analysts to question Germany's commitment to fostering European unity in foreign and security policy matters.⁸⁸

Finding a balance between national sovereignty and intergovernmental decisions is difficult politics. Not only due member states' politicians have to tip-toe the lines along the traditionally sovereign territory of sensitive issues like foreign and security policy, but they have to satisfy the constituents of their own nation by pursuing national interests and reducing expenditures. Playing to the shifting interests of their national voters is a particularly difficult task for the German political leaders when negotiating a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Often the German government was moving ahead of the popular attitude of the constituents. A series of Eurobarometers indicate that in 1989, just ahead of unification, popular sentiments in the FRG aligned with the policy aims of the German government, at least in regards to a common EU foreign security and defense policy. The trend consistently increased during the lead up to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty indicating a clear majority of those polled—seventy-five percent were in favor of “foreign policy towards others countries” should be decided by the EU and fifty-five percent supported the opinion that “security and defense policy” should be decided by the EU.⁸⁹

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 outlined the basic ideas behind the establishment of a federative state with greater sovereign powers, European Union, and it laid the foundation for the CFSP.⁹⁰ Through intergovernmentalism, the European nations surrendered some of the realm traditionally held within national sovereignty in support of maintaining peace and prosperity. France had traditionally dominated European politics while Germany exerted more influence over economic and monetary policy, but Germany now assumed a larger role politically than before unification.⁹¹ Helmut Kohl said, “For us Germans there are no niches in world politics, and Germany should not be

⁸⁸ Paul Belkin, “German Foreign and Security Policy: Trends and Transatlantic Implications,” (Congressional Research Service, May 20, 2009), 8.

⁸⁹ Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 52.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 43.

⁹¹ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 4.

able to evade its responsibilities.”⁹² Kohl and the German government took this mindset to the negotiations at Maastricht, and the result was the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. The CFSP became an intergovernmental pillar of the EU that stated, “Member states shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”⁹³ The European vision of military security was pinned on the Western European Union, but the European Union was still not ready to provide a credible military security option outside of NATO—and not without the assistance of American military might as became manifest in Bosnia in 1994 and the decision in 1995 to enlarge NATO.

B. GERMANY, NATO, AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Germany increased economic integration during the 1990s culminating in the establishment of the Eurozone (January 1, 1999); Germany also supported the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).⁹⁴ In the wake of the Cold War, the European Union wanted to establish itself as a credible political actor on the international stage in defense of liberal ideals such as safeguarding human rights and providing humanitarian aid.⁹⁵ One of the main concerns within the nations during the 1990s debates about the Common Foreign Security Policy was whether an EU defense policy would jeopardize the current NATO security framework.⁹⁶

The Europeans recognized that NATO had effectively maintained security in Europe during the Cold War, and for some members of the EU—mainly the United Kingdom—there was little need for the EU to create a security and defense policy outside of NATO or beyond the members own national policies. There was much friction between the three big powers and the United States. There were those in the American

⁹² Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 42.

⁹³ Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 42.

⁹⁴ Welsh, “Ascent,” 212.

⁹⁵ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 22.

⁹⁶ Sven Gareis, “The Relationship Between the EU and NATO: Complementary Cooperation of institutional Rivalry,” in *The European Union – A Global Actor?*, eds. Sven Gareis, Gunther Hauser & Franz Kernic (Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2013), 128.

government skeptical of German embrace of France in the EU as well as a French attempt to rejoin the NATO integrated military structure amid the ambition to create CFSP. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously categorized this skepticism in the 3 Ds: no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination.⁹⁷

The United Kingdom wanted to maintain the current strong transatlantic alliance with the North American partners and to reduce redundancies with NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).⁹⁸ France—always a bit aloof within the NATO structure—wanted more European autonomy of security and defense as a way to further build the EU to great power status.⁹⁹ Germany sought to balance both views by using the CFSP to strengthen the EU foreign and security policy without negatively affecting the NATO security relationship. Chancellor Kohl envisaged a stronger role for the EU within NATO. He believed that by creating more solidarity under a new European political Union, that the EU could show the United States that the Europeans were ready to shoulder more of their own security and to contribute more effectively to NATO.¹⁰⁰

The end of the Cold War signaled a rapid draw down of European military forces as the potential for great power conflict in Europe subsided. The united Germany chose to sustain the policies of the FRG and pursue a peaceful path partially because of the legacy of the epoch of total war and also because unity required Germany to more or less disarm to a much lower level than the state of forces in October 1990 as part of the Two Plus Four negotiations.¹⁰¹ The unification included a general disarmament and partial assimilation of the East German soldiers (NVA *Nationale Volksarmee* [National People's Army]) into the Bundeswehr. Abenheim commends the Bundeswehr's adherence to the leadership concept of *Innere Führung* for the successful—though not perfect—

⁹⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 20.

⁹⁸ Ibid, 3.

⁹⁹ Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E. Penska. *The European Union in Global Security: The Politics of Impact*. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 151-2.

¹⁰⁰ Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 39.

¹⁰¹ Adrian Hyde-Price, "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?" in *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, ed. Douglas Webber, (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2001), 22.

integration of former NVA soldiers and officers into the Bundeswehr.¹⁰² The success allowed Germany to remain a key strategic partner in NATO even with an agreed total troop reduction to 370,000 down from the nearly 600,000 soldiers maintained in garrison until October 1990.¹⁰³

As the Soviet threat receded, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crises arose, and NATO redefined itself as a crisis management capable force due to the lack of a credible security alternative in Europe.¹⁰⁴ Until this time, NATO had not been primarily a crisis management force meant to provide general economic security. The Europeans wanted a force capable of out of area operations to ensure security in places like Africa without having to convince the United States to intervene. A European force also allows for a more European approach to crisis management that may provide other options different from the dominant US-centric security paradigm, but as Yale Professor of Political Science Jolyon Howorth notes, “the forging a common European strategic culture is probably *the* greatest challenge facing the CSDP.”¹⁰⁵

The evolving global security situation continued to evolve with humanitarian crises in the Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda. Germany had been paralyzed by its own war guilt from the past and an internal distrust of its newly acquired power after unification. A Socialist leader in Germany, Oscar Lafontaine, made a comment “that to ask Germany to send troops to the Gulf would be like offering brandied chocolate to a recovering alcoholic.”¹⁰⁶ However, the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia forced those in Berlin to manifest their war pervasive war guilt to motivate necessary military action. Germans now recognized that checkbook diplomacy would not earn the government the necessary recognition of its rising power amongst the great powers. The decision to participate in military airstrikes represented a break from the past. The argument that military action in

¹⁰² Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics*, 40.

¹⁰³ Abenheim, *Soldiers and Politics*, 40.

¹⁰⁴ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 123.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 241.

¹⁰⁶ Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, 142.

Kosovo was a German responsibility in order to act against an apparent genocide—especially in its own European neighborhood.

The nature of NATO is a defensive alliance intended to protect its members that need the assistance of more powerful nations from aggression, specifically from aggressive states, and with the demise of the Soviet Union, the most aggressive nation in the neighborhood has been declawed. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, the fundamental problems of European order endured, even if the end of the USSR seemed to some to have eradicated the purpose of NATO. NATO, of course, had kept the United States engaged and also offered a framework for Germany, requirements which had not vanished at all. The Kosovo crisis revealed that Europe still needed a United States military presence to provide security and a credible military option when diplomacy failed—even in Europe’s own backyard.¹⁰⁷

Germany continued to show itself as a reliable Alliance member by participating in the bombing of Kosovo in 1999. Despite all talk of civilian power as well as endemic pacifism, the Schroeder-Fischer government led to the decision to participate in the Kosovo airstrikes even in the absence of a UN resolution. The German people felt that something must be done to stop the genocide, and this time, “Germans wanted to be on the ‘right side.’ ”¹⁰⁸ The NATO campaign in Kosovo also presented an opportunity for Germany to reaffirm its commitment to the Alliance by participating in an offensive capacity. Despite the support to stop an obviously atrocity on its own continent, the fear of the past kept the Germans apprehensive about the use of military force. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer commented concerning the German constraints to the use of force, “I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, you cannot mutter about having no [UN Security Council] mandate. You must act.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Gareis, “Relationship,” 130.

¹⁰⁸ Hyde-Price, “Kosovo,” 22.

¹⁰⁹ Joschka Fischer quoted in Roger Cohen, “‘We Will Deal With Our History’: Fischer, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Looks Ahead to Berlin,” *International Herald Tribune*, 29 January 1999.

The German government's effort to establish an EU security and defense policy outside of NATO also demonstrates a more realist approach to foreign policy. By building security options other than NATO, Germany has shaped a security and defense policy more in line with its own national interest conveniently shrouded in a multilateral partnership. The Germans are responding to the external triggers that threat European security, but the threats are not so severe as to invoke a response from NATO. The development of an EU option for security and defense also provides a defense option for the six non-NATO members of the European Union.

Enlargement was a theme for both NATO and the EU, 1999 also marked the year when the EU admitted the first of the new central European democracies to emerge from the former Warsaw Pact. NATO and the EU admitted many countries of the former Warsaw Pact in rapid succession from 1999 until 2004 (See Figure 1). Germany and NATO shared goals to unite Europe in an economic and political union under a trans-Atlantic security umbrella in order to sustain the long period of peace.¹¹⁰ The NATO enlargement after the Cold War also demonstrated the United States commitment to supporting liberal democracy in Europe by placing more European nations under its security umbrella.

The end of the Cold War left many questions in the minds of skeptics of the continued relevancy of NATO in Europe. Even with the US force reductions in Europe since 1991, the Global War on Terror, and more recently, the ballyhooed 'Pacific Pivot,' the United States has not reduced its commitment to NATO or European collective security.¹¹¹ Despite reductions in force, the United States assumed a leading role in the crisis management of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, as well as took a lead in NATO enlargement, and, surely, never withdrew from the Washington Treaty. In fact, as of this writing in 2016, there exists a significant reorientation of resources effort—coined the

¹¹⁰ Catherine Kelleher and Cathleen Fisher, "Germany," in Murray, Douglas J., and Paul R Viotti, eds. *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 166.

¹¹¹ Ginsberg and Penska. *Politics of Impact*, 243.

European Reassurance Initiative—to restore confidence within the Atlantic Alliance to face Russian aggression in Ukraine and intervention Syria.¹¹²

Figure 1. NATO and EU Enlargement Comparison

<u>NATO Enlargement*</u>	<u>EU Enlargement</u>
•Bulgaria (2004)	•Bulgaria (2007)
•Croatia (2009)	•Croatia (2013)
•Czech Republic (1999)	•Czech Republic (2004)
•Estonia (2004)	•Estonia (2004)
•Hungary (1999)	•Hungary (2004)
•Latvia (2004)	•Latvia (2004)
•Lithuania (2004)	•Lithuania (2004)
•Poland (1999)	•Poland (2004)
•Romania (2004)	•Romania (2007)
•Slovakia (2004)	•Slovakia (2004)
•Slovenia (2004)	•Slovenia (2004)

Adapted from: “Countries.” European Union, accessed on March 5, 2016, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm & “A short history of NATO,” Accessed on March 5, 2016, <http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html>

* Some countries left off for illustrative purposes.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era in Europe and the United States of omnipresent optimism. The embrace of liberal democracy by many of the former Soviet bloc nations in Central Europe and the subsequent invitation and acceptance into the European Union and NATO for many of these nations supported some of the optimism. Nevertheless, the realities of the evolving security environment and the failure of the America’s unipolar moment to quell genocide in Africa and unrest in the Middle East tamed the high spirits. The situation in Kosovo proved to be a reminder that American engagement in Europe was still needed, and that despite the creation of the CSDP, Europe was still unable to provide for its own security. The result is a confusing mismatch of conflicting military ambitions. The effort to not duplicate NATO capabilities

¹¹² “FACT SHEET: The FY2017 European Reassurance Initiative Budget Request,” February 02, 2016, Accessed on March 15, 2016, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/02/fact-sheet-fy2017-european-reassurance-initiative-budget-request>.

with EU military ambitions has hindered the EU's efforts to be a credible security behind a wall of impossible bureaucracy and political rhetoric. The bargain made by the Atlantic Alliance—that Europe accepted American leadership in return for a security guarantee and a voice in setting international law—began to deteriorate.¹¹³ The strain of conflicting views on Middle East policy would lead Europe's leading nations—France and Germany—to defy American demands while still touting the solidarity of the Alliance. The new millennium, the rise of international terrorism, and the Arab question would put the solidarity of both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance to the test. Most recently since 2014, the Bundeswehr has begun to rebuild its weakened force structure on the continent of Europe—moving to an all-volunteer professional force and increasing the defense budget—in a move that only the most paranoid foresaw in the year 1995.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Philip Stephens, "Europe and the United States: The Obama Era and the Weight of History," in *European Foreign Policies: Does Europe Still Matter*, Ronald Tiersky and John Van Oudeanaren eds., (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 59.

¹¹⁴ Abenheim, discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

IV. THE EMERGING GREAT POWER

On September 11, 2001, the focus of international attention would shift from post-Cold War optimism to the American declared Global War on Terror. The outcries of solidarity ensconced by the French newspaper *Le Monde*'s headline "We Are All Americans Now," were echoed by Germany's support for the recommendation to evoke Article 5 of the Washington treaty, the only time that Article 5 has been declared.¹¹⁵ But demonstrating a lack of confidence in the European allies, the United States President George W. Bush, requested only a support role for its NATO allies, and instead sought to build an international coalition of the willing to enlist in the newly coined "Global War on Terror." The Bush bipolar attitude of "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" fostered disillusion and resentment in Berlin and Paris.¹¹⁶ This dissention would come to head during the buildup before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The rising economic power of Germany and the admittance of Central and Eastern European nations in the European Union have shifted political leadership of Europe east from Paris to Berlin. The episode of dissention of the Iraq invasion in 2003 was a bilateral stance of Germany with France in the lead. The abstention of support for the UN Security Council resolution on Libya was taken by Germany alone, against its traditional allies and in line with the abstention votes of Russia and China. The German Chancellor, Angela Merkel has emerged as the de facto leader of Europe and she has taken the lead during the three major crises to challenge the European Union in the recent decade—the Greek debt crisis, the Ukrainian crisis, and the refugee crisis. While the outcome of these crises is still undetermined, the realization of the world to the leadership of Germany in Europe cannot be denied and must be considered with when working with Europe.

¹¹⁵ Stephens, "Europe and the United States," 59.

¹¹⁶ George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001. Accessed on <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

A. THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

The Wars of Yugoslav Succession in the 1990s formed a significant trigger for Germany to support the further development of the CFSP to include a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). During the debates in the *Bundestag* over whether to forgo the Basic Law and contribute military assistance in Kosovo Joschka Fischer argued:

We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force...On the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence—that is our dilemma.¹¹⁷

The Bundeswehr finally participated in airstrikes along with NATO partners because at the beginning of the crisis in the early 1990s the EU lacked the political will as well as the capabilities to act without United States help. This fact highlighted the lack of a credible military force for the EU, forcing the European Union to consider with greater intent adding a military force to support the EU foreign policy goals. The Balkans signified the security dilemma that required more than just the civilian power capabilities of the EU. While the German government is not condoning a foreign policy that is more militaristic per se, but the Germans and the European Union have come to the realization that the de facto leadership role of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU), requires a strong military capability to support the foreign policy goals.¹¹⁸

The EU recognized the limits to foreign policy without a capable military option, and this led to the Saint Malo Declaration in 1998. The Saint Malo declaration, with its Anglo French entente of a new kind was a step forward towards integrating a capable military option into the CFSP.¹¹⁹ The EU needed a military capability to perform crisis management operations that were not necessarily within NATO's purview—mainly in Africa where America had little interests. But the Europeans efforts to build and support

¹¹⁷ Hanns W. Maull, "German foreign policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'civilian power?'", *German Politics*, Vol. 9 Issue 2, 2000, DOI: 10.1080/09644000008404589, 7.

¹¹⁸ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 22-3.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, 9.

an EU military force have been constrained by lack of public support for military operations and lack of viable economic support. Saint Malo represented the EU's ambitions to further support its own security and defense, and to achieve security in a manner independent from the United States.¹²⁰ In the declaration, the EU stated that the EU needs "to play its full role on the international stage," "to have the capacity for autonomous action," and "to have a strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly."¹²¹ The EU needed to leverage the capabilities that were built for NATO, and this leverage was granted via the Berlin Plus arrangement that allowed NATO members to share planning capacity and essentially lease the required materiel to support EU missions until the nations could supply the materiel for the EU themselves. The United States was not enthusiastic to lend its high-tech gear to relatively poorly trained EU troops without proper training.¹²²

The interesting fact surrounding the Saint Malo declaration was the absence of German at the talks. Although Germany—in a partnership with France—had been a leading supporter of the development of the CFSP, French and British defense elites questioned Germany's military capabilities and willingness to act.¹²³ German statecraft seeks, generally, mutual understanding and a resistance to the use of force. Certain academics believe that a culture of atonement and the lessons of defeat as well as German interests led to the rise of a no to out of area in the Cold War, which became a policy of very limited use of the Bundeswehr outside of Europe since 1990.¹²⁴ Domestic apprehension and constitutional constraints created a foreign policy in which expeditionary military operations hardly figured at all because of domestic and international reasons.¹²⁵ Domestic constraints such as public opinion and the Basic Law coupled with the original need to defend West Germany summarize the reasons why Germany only reluctantly used military force in small steps since 1990. The German

¹²⁰ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 8.

¹²¹ Ibid, 9.

¹²² Ibid, 76.

¹²³ Hyde-Price, *CFSP*, 107.

¹²⁴ Feldman, *Reconciliation*, 22.

¹²⁵ Ibid, 22.

government's concern over the evolving security situation in Europe led to a change in the drivers behind the conduct of German foreign policy.

The German constitutional limitations in Article 87a and Article 24 led the Bundeswehr to seek only to operate within a coalition and only with a UN mandate. Further, concern exists in Berlin to placate both international and domestic fears about German national interests driving EU foreign policy.¹²⁶ Germany has the strenuous task of maintaining a strong commitment to both the transatlantic partnership and the European Union. The strong support for NATO, CSDP, and a possible European Army manifest this support. But the German enthusiasm for a common EU defense force has met the reality of too many political caveats and the limited economic resources of their EU members especially as the number of crises has recently overwhelmed all concerned.

Lisbon Treaty of 2009 introduced a "Solidarity Clause (Art. 222(1))" and a "Mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7))"¹²⁷ These statements were meant to complement the NATO security umbrella while also including security guarantees to EU members that are not part of NATO. Germany supports an EU military policy and force, but it has also come to understand the familiar concepts of a capability gap and burden sharing in this specific context. The smaller EU nations want to utilize the support of the larger countries military and economic power at the best value for their own nation. In addition, contemporary external threats will not wait for the development of the EU military to reach its full potential. Germany customarily sends its military under the banner of an international coalition, but unfortunately, the Germans may not find as much actual support for their cause either at home or in the international organizations.

The EU framework allows the Bundeswehr to operate within a coalition in pursuit of European Union policy that are aligned with German national interest. This policy satisfies both the German domestic apprehension to support military capabilities and the other European nations' wariness of a powerful German military. The Germans could

¹²⁶ Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 45.

¹²⁷ Gunther Hauser, "The Common Foreign Security and Defense Policy after 'Lisbon'," in in *The European Union – A Global Actor?* eds. Sven Gareis, Gunther Hauser & Franz Kernic (Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2013), 42.

build up and modernize its equipment to satisfy multiple requirements: NATO, EU, and national. The idea of pooling and sharing envisioned at the 1999 NATO Washington Summit by the “Berlin Plus” arrangements allows smaller nations to contribute to EU security when they would not be able to do so on their own, but the plan also rests on the operational status of the promised equipment.¹²⁸ The lack of common EU standards and regulations to maintain the promised materiel for defense signifies a recipe for failure when the equipment may be needed most. High-tech German equipment could become the standard equipment for many uses to be added to the pooling and sharing reserves for crisis management operations a goal that fits with its national economic goals.¹²⁹

While some anxious figures still believe a militarily strong Germany could represent a potential threat to the world balance of power, especially within Europe, the need for such a force is growing rapidly among those with a sane view of policy. The counter would be either for Germany to operate unilaterally or within a multilateral coalition outside of the EU. The CSDP protects national interests within the framework of EU supranational and intergovernmental frameworks that support European interest.¹³⁰ The limitations of national constitutions, public support, and budget constraints on the participation of some countries in EU operations may force larger and more capable countries to contribute more, but if the policy can provide security and defense for all and peace maintained, then the benefits of such a policy may be well worth the cost.

The German government supported both the CFSP and the further development of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU.¹³¹ The increased integration of the EU security and defense institutions has been a focal point for German security policy. The Bundeswehr’s participation in the airstrikes in Kosovo was the first combat action for the Bundeswehr since 1945.¹³² The government used peacekeeping and action within

¹²⁸ Yost, *Transformed*, 253.

¹²⁹ Howorth, *Security and Defence*, 76.

¹³⁰ Ginsberg and Penska. *Politics of Impact*, 231.

¹³¹ Ibid, 155.

¹³² Hyde-Price, “Kosovo,” 21.

a multilateral coalition to slowly build domestic support for further out-of-area military operations.¹³³

When the Al Qaeda terror attacks against the United States Eastern seaboard unfolded in the summer of 2001, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to NATO by supporting the Article 5 declaration following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Germany provided and sustained troops in Afghanistan at first on a bilateral basis and later with than what became NATO's ISAF. Germany's increasing focus on security could be part of an effort to assuage perennial American concerns of burden sharing and free riding. Arguments requesting more support from European allies such as from David Yost:

the allies have yet to reach a consensus endorsing with specificity the 'job description' for NATO outlined by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz: 'Fighting terrorism, which has been so clearly linked to weapons of mass destruction, is part of NATO's basic job description: Collective Defense ... Article 5 threats can come from anywhere, in many forms.'¹³⁴

One must say that Wolfowitz enjoyed no particular popularity with German security elites, and his own partisanship as a lord of war in 2001 soon backfired in the popular backlash in German domestic politics in 2002–2003 as the Iraqi campaign unfolded.¹³⁵

After the initial support for the War on Terror, by 2003 German security policy diverged with the policy of the United States. A difference in the American way and the European approach to security amid the counter terror campaigns as they matured in the first years after the attacks caused the divergence. Germany strongly supported the growth of the CSDP, but its ambitions were limited by the EU's lack of credible military capability – hence the Berlin Plus arrangements that are not popular with some other NATO nations. Initially following unification, Germany focused foreign policy on increasing integration in Europe, but during the 2000s, there was a shift away from

¹³³ Hyde-Price, "Kosovo," 21.

¹³⁴ Yost, "Transatlantic," 298.

¹³⁵ Abenheim, discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

multilateral cooperation.¹³⁶ However, a lack of cooperation and cohesion in EU security policy leaves many nations—including Germany—looking for alternatives to NATO and CSDP.¹³⁷

Initially following unification, Germany foreign policy focused on increasing integration in Europe, but during the 2000s, there was a shift away from multilateral cooperation.¹³⁸ In 2002, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was determined to opt of the multinational coalition during the Iraq war regardless of a decision on a UN resolution.¹³⁹ The strains in the alliance cohesion and strategic purpose of the US led efforts in the Global War on Terrorism have degraded the unity of German and NATO policy. Kundnani notes that since reunification, there has been a change in Germany's foreign policy paradigm with the United States, and there is no longer a Cold War "codependent but unequal" relationship.¹⁴⁰ Donald Abenheim states that any significant degradation of the German - American and NATO security structure could have "unpredictable consequences" for the current world order of sustained liberal democracy and economic prosperity.¹⁴¹ Germany has shown its willingness to stand apart from the United States and the NATO alliance as in the 2011 Libyan episode, while still reaffirming support to its NATO Article 5 commitments to NATO members in the wake of the Russian adventure in Ukraine.¹⁴²

Germany's political leaders are moving towards assuming a larger role in world affairs both unilaterally and within the auspices of the EU.¹⁴³ Germany sought to provide

¹³⁶ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 34.

¹³⁷ Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy*, 234.

¹³⁸ Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-Economic Power," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2011, 34.

¹³⁹ Kundnani, "Geo-economic," 35.

¹⁴⁰ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 113.

¹⁴¹ Donald Abenheim, *Soldier and Politics Transformed: German-American Reflections on Civil-Military Relations in a New Strategic Environment*, (Berlin: Carola Hartmann Miles, 2007) 111.

¹⁴² "Wales Summit Declaration," *NATO*, Last updated on July 31, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

¹⁴³ Ralf Neukirch and Gordon Repinski, "Foreign Policy Rethink: Germany Weighs Stronger Military Role," *der Spiegel*, January 28, 2014, Accessed on <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-considers-increasing-role-in-foreign-military-missions-a-945771.html>.

more options for European security by supporting the CFSP and the development of a Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) in a hope to create a multilateral security policy more reflective of a European approach to international affairs. However, lack of cohesion and limited military capability have held the program's efforts to lesser magnitude crisis management operations.¹⁴⁴

B. THE RISING ECONOMIC POWER

Hans Kundnani contended that post-unification Germany has evolved into a so-called geo-economic power, a term fitted that fits within and which attempts to characterize German foreign policy, especially in the last decade. As a geo-economic power, Germany has sought to influence other nations' will using its economic power.¹⁴⁵ Initially, Germany acted like a civilian power through the 1990s by focusing on the increased integration of Europe—politically and economically. Kundnani claims that since the world economic crisis and the security chaos that has followed Germany has increasingly used its economic power to push other European nations to adopt its policies.¹⁴⁶ Since the recent Euro crisis in Greece, especially, Germany now promotes itself as the role-model for fiscal responsibility and believes the solution to the Euro crisis is to force other Eurozone economies to accept its lead on austerity economic policies based on the Swabian school model.¹⁴⁷

Even this scenario resurrected the fears of the return of the German *Sonderweg*—*special path*. In response to the perceived similarity to the Nazi past, a *Der Spiegel* cover declaring “The German *Übermacht*” while displaying Chancellor Angela Merkel superimposed alongside Nazis on top of the Acropolis in Athens in 1941.¹⁴⁸ The magazine went to print as the Greek government—most likely out of desperation—even brought up claim of unfulfilled reparations from the Nazi occupation of Greece in 1941.

¹⁴⁴ Bastian Giegerich, “Military Transitions in the CSDP,” in *The European Union –A Global Actor?*, eds. Sven Gareis, Gunther Hauser & Franz Kernic (Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2013), 86.

¹⁴⁵ Kundnani, “Geo-economic Power,” 33.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁸ “The German *Übermacht*,” *der Spiegel*, Nr. 13 March 21, 2015.

But the historical accusations failed to drum up the intended distain for Germany's strict economic policies either within Germany or in the international community, and the Germany stuck to the austerity policy and failed to waiver on their belief in austerity. The Holocaust has now been Europeanized, and Germany uses a shroud of normalization as a "code word" to focus policy in the pursuit of national interests and disagreements with Alliance members.¹⁴⁹

Germany has reaffirmed its desire since unification to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Its request was supported by other members of the so-called G4—Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan—that believe that the current UN Security Council does not reflect the current world situation. The request was met with skepticism from the current permanent members of the UN Security—United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, and France—that were appointed in the wake of World War II in 1946.¹⁵⁰ Germany is the third largest contributor to the UN, and currently considered a leader in Europe. However, a simultaneous competing desire to gain a permanent European Union seat on the UNSC hampered the request. Europe pays approximately 40% of the UN budget and Germany is the third biggest contributor behind the United States and Japan.¹⁵¹

C. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT: LEADERSHIP FROM THE CENTRE

The policy of leadership from the centre is a change in German foreign policy that both assumes a larger international leadership role and represents a challenge for the cohesion of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Nevertheless, the realities of limited domestic support for a larger role on the international stage and the lack of support for critical funding to improve the Bundeswehr's military capabilities may check Germany's international aspirations. The concentration of various crises in

¹⁴⁹ Welsh, "Ascent," 219.

¹⁵⁰ Stefan A. Schirm, "Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance." *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (July 2010): doi:<http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066109342922>, 203.

¹⁵¹ Regular Payments of the Largest Players: 2012, Global Policy Forum, accessed on February 19, 2016, https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Regular_Budget_Payments_of_Largest_Payers2012.pdf.

and around Europe may overturn some of the core assumptions of civil power as the European Union endures its greatest trial in decades.

Germany's recent ascent to middle power status has happened very quickly, and well ahead of German public opinion which admires more the neutral foreign policies of Switzerland and Austria, while failing to recognize that such policy is a dead end.¹⁵² Germany's is—and has been for quite some time—seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but this effort to gain more power internationally will fall on deaf ears unless the German government expresses more willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr in a wider range of expeditionary military operations.¹⁵³ In the wake of recent events, including the Ukraine crisis, in the European region have pushed Germany to the forefront of European Union foreign relations.¹⁵⁴

There is a claim that Germany cannot promote a successful foreign policy without the support of its own effective military capability.¹⁵⁵ The German Bundeswehr has operated under a mainly support role within the auspices of NATO as a goal of policy to avoid too much military power and to assuage public opinion which remains skeptical of war, especially in the present. The end of the Cold War, economic constraints, and growing security challenges in the Pacific have led to a reduction of US military forces in the European theatre—requiring the Europeans to strongly consider providing for more of their own security and defense.¹⁵⁶ The United States had withdrawn nearly all effective military force from Central Europe—that is until the sudden decision to reinforce after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.

The influence of reconciliation on German foreign and security policy has been reduced to almost nothing. Germany still seeks to operate with a multilateral framework, but less because of the need to reconcile but more to maximize security on limited

¹⁵² “German Foreign Policy: A Lurch onto the World Stage,” *The Economist*, February 28, 2015, 32.

¹⁵³ Hyde-Price, “Kosovo,” 23.

¹⁵⁴ *Economist*, “Lurch onto World Stage,” 33.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 34.

¹⁵⁶ Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellman, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality,” in Douglas Webber, ed., *New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy Since Unification*, (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 2001), 65.

budgets. A realistic use of bandwagoning with the current US led world order to get the most security for the least cost are behind the German agreements of pooling and sharing and the commitment the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁵⁷ Germany's security policy is still driven by the same concerns of Bismarck's time—geopolitics. Germany has safely secured itself in the center of the European Union and the center of the NATO Alliance. Germany's security—in geopolitical terms—was greatly enhanced by the EU and NATO periods of enlargement that added the nations of Central Europe and the Baltic nations.¹⁵⁸ Formal agreements with Scandinavian countries whether through the EU, NATO, or both have completely encircled Germany by friendly nations. The absence of natural borders has been replaced with political borders that have created a virtual buffer zone around the German mainland.

Within this zone of relative security, Germany focused its policy on economic growth and further political and economic integration of the European Union within a globalized economy. While at the same time, Germany has risen past the traditional nuclear powers of France and the United Kingdom to take the *de facto* leadership role of the EU. Germany now finds itself at the center of Europe—geographically and in both security and political terms. Since reunification, the German government has also separated itself from American policy pressure by demonstrating independence of policy decisions in Iraq 2003 joining with France and again in 2011 concerning the Libya UN resolution siding with Russia and China against the wishes of its NATO allies.

The Munich Security Conference is an annual meeting of leaders every February in Munich to discuss contemporary security and defense topics affecting the global world order. The attendees often include at a minimum the respective Ministers of Defense from European nations and the United States and Canada. The conference provides a forum for discussion of the most pressing European security topics that are presently concerning leaders. The Munich Security Report—first released in 2015—is meant as a way to provide topics for discussion and accompanying statistics to support conversations

¹⁵⁷ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 139.

¹⁵⁸ Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, 3rd ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), 15-6.

of key issues to be discussed. The 2015 Report highlighted pressure from other powers that Germany shoulders its weight in maintaining international security relative with its economic influence.¹⁵⁹

Political leaders use the speeches made during the conference as a means for nations to declare their own roles in addressing the current security concerns and as a way to address any specific concerns of the members of the conference. During the 2015 Munich Security Conference, German Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, made a speech titled “Leadership from the Centre.” The speech’s theme was that Germany was ready to lead in Europe, but that it intended to take a new approach to leadership in Europe. Dr. Von der Leyen laid out her vision of what leadership from the centre means:

Leading from the centre means to contribute one’s best resources and capabilities to alliances and partnerships. Leadership from the centre is as we understand it means to enable others with less resources to make their vital contributions as equal partners. Leadership from the centre also means that two things must come together: The will to act and the capability to act.¹⁶⁰

Germany is thus at the centre of transatlantic and European policy. The 2014 Security Conference speeches from the German President, Foreign Minister, and Dr. Von der Leyen reinforce that the Defense Minister was announcing a conscious shift in German strategy concerning foreign and security policy.

The ambitions of the German government and politicians have constantly moved at a pace ahead of the desires of the German populace. This phenomenon was true during Adenauer’s Western integration and Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*, and it remained consistent in the post-unification Germany as well. Since unification, the German government championed Germany’s drive for further integration. The general public is less enthusiastic about the integration and for most people walking the streets of German cities and towns, the EU has little effect on their daily lives. Many Germans have mixed feelings about such integration. They enjoy travel and lack of border controls, but they

¹⁵⁹ “Germany: Ready To Lead?” 10.

¹⁶⁰ Von der Leyen, “Leadership.”

are also skeptical of the Euro and nurtures nostalgia for the Deutschmark in what seems to many today to have been a simpler world prior to 1989—a wrongheaded nostalgia.¹⁶¹ Voter turnout for the EU parliamentary elections has been steadily declining across the EU, and Germany is part of this trend. Voter turnout numbers in Germany were above 60% in 1989 and 1994 but it has experienced a steady declining with just over 40% reporting to vote in 2009 and 2014 hovering only slightly higher than the EU average.¹⁶²

Customarily in Germany, there is highly structured communication between the government and the public concerning foreign policy, especially when compared to the relationship in the United States or Switzerland.¹⁶³ The German people have shown a lack of commitment to the foreign policy aims of the government, and often a downright dissatisfaction, especially when concerning the out-of-area deployment of the Bundeswehr.¹⁶⁴ In response to this lack of support, the German Foreign Minister, Frank Walter Steinmeier, ordered the so-called “Review 2014.” The goal was to create an open dialogue between the public and the government about the future and shape of the German foreign policy.¹⁶⁵ The German Foreign Ministry has released the results of the Review 2014 in a document titled “Crisis-Order-Europe.” The review revealed, among other topics, that “Germans’ views on foreign policy are anything but static: the younger generation has markedly different priorities than the older generations.”¹⁶⁶ The open dialogue with the Foreign Ministry is a step towards involving more public debate about Germany’s role in international affairs, but there is little indication that domestic sentiments will hinder the advancement of Berlin’s foreign and security policy goals in the future.

¹⁶¹ Abenheim, discussion with author, March 3, 2016.

¹⁶² European Parliament 2014 Election Results/Turnout, Accessed on February 5, 2016, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html>.

¹⁶³ Manfred Mols, “Policy Advice and Foreign Policy-Making,” from *Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision Making in an Interdependent World*, Wolf-Dieter Eberwien & Karl Kaiser, eds., trans. Deborah Kaiser & Bryan Ruppert, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 280.

¹⁶⁴ “Germany: Ready To Lead?” 10.

¹⁶⁵ Aussenpolitik-Weiter-Denken, accessed on February 4, 2016, <http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/en/blog/show/article/auftakt-konferenz-im-aa.html>

¹⁶⁶ *Review 2014: Crisis-Order-Europe*, February 25, 2015, <http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/en/topics.html>, 7.

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V. CONCLUSION

This thesis cannot proclaim a return of history by suggesting that unstable balance of power politics are back in Europe. This thesis recognizes that Germany has undergone a significant transformation from the defeated, divided, and occupied nation of 1945. The leadership of such visionaries as Adenauer and Brandt that through a policy of reconciliation achieved the goals of ensuring the security of the Federal Republic of Germany, regaining its sovereignty in return for western integration, and through *Ostpolitik*, laid the foundation for the eventual reunification of Germany in 1990. During the Kohl era (1982 – 1998), the dream of a peaceful reunification of Germany became a reality, and the path to the EU and the Euro was embarked upon. These men increased European integration that would welcome many of the former Central European Soviet satellite states that embraced the ideals of liberal democracy.

This thesis does recognize that Germany has completed a long policy of reconciliation, and that reconciliation for Nazi war crimes committed during World War II no longer drives the foreign and security policy decisions of the German government. The Germany that emerged from defeat bearing the tremendous guilt of the holocaust and the Nazis has become the leading nation in Europe through its support for multilateralism and increased European integration. This is not to say that Germans have forgotten history, but that the reconciliation no longer constitutes the guiding principal of German statecraft or the German people in their dealings on the international stage. Egon Bahr, a prominent SPD politician and major contributor of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, recently claimed that "a Germany in the service of Europe that pursues its interest as a normal state and does not let its future be impeded by its past: Europe's future is more important than Germany's past."¹⁶⁷

The policy of reconciliation that the Adenauer government adopted drove the foreign and security policy of Germany to demonstrate itself as a reliable partner in the

¹⁶⁷ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 65.

security of Western Europe. This policy required the Federal Republic to integrate into multilateral economic, security, and political institutions. The need to reconcile with the western nations—especially France—guided the West German government first, in order to earn acceptance back into the family of nations and second, to gain complete sovereignty from the occupying powers. The European Coal and Steel Community arrangement with France laid the foundation for the European Union, and the Federal Republic was a key supporter in all stages of its development and continues to be a leading supporter of further European integration.

The difference between now and then is that reconciliation no longer solely drives Germany's foreign policy to embrace multilateralism. Instead, Germany's support of multilateralism is driven by national interest amid globalization—specifically the economic, political, and security benefits of membership in the European Union. Membership in the Eurozone has deflated the value of German goods on the export market when compared to the similar costs if Germany still used the Deutschmark. Also, by being the leading member of a powerful supranational block of nations with over 500 million people and trade that accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports, Germany exponentially multiplies its diplomatic power when dealing with other nations.

By integrating into and supporting collective security and defense arrangements like the OSCE, CSDP, and most importantly NATO, Germany has achieved a complete level of security despite its geographical position in the center of Europe. The fear of armies crossing its open borders no longer drives German security policy. Instead, the German government elite are focusing security policy on maintaining the Atlantic alliance while also building a separate Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. NATO will continue to provide a level of collective security that the EU could not achieve without the powerful military support of the United States and its credible nuclear deterrent.

After unification, and more recently, with the odd retreat of France and the United Kingdom, Germany has become the leading nation in the European Union. Some observers consider Germany to be the great power in Europe surpassing the nuclear armed and permanent UN Security Council members of France and the United Kingdom.

This policy should not be a cause, as realists like Mearsheimer wrote, to believe that a Germany would be a destabilizing force in Europe and would seek to arm itself with nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁸ Germany's growing power has come without the added and utterly unwanted burden of financing a costly nuclear program through its continued credibility as a NATO member. Instead, Germany has used its powerful position to steer EU policy, and to further advance the European Union's foreign and security policy both politically and economically. This power has allowed Germany the freedom of policy to stand on its own—like with Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011)—in pursuit of its own interest—to act or not to act and to act in regions more aligned with EU and by default, Germany's own national interest. Kundnani asserts that in some ways, Germany's status as a potential hegemon has created instability in Europe by forcefully exporting its “stability culture”—particularly in economic terms.¹⁶⁹

Germany's leadership has emerged because of its ability to lead from the center. Its geographic position in the center of Europe and its unique understanding of the Cold War from both the western and the central European views allows Germany to be a uniting force in the EU. Germany was a supporter of both EU and NATO expansion to include the new burgeoning democracies of Central Europe in an effort to ensure their success, and for them to gain the acceptance into the family of nation not as soviet satellites but as full members of the international community. These shared collective memories of life on both sides of the Iron Curtain will continue to provide Germany a special relationship between Eastern and Western Europe.

German politicians have sought to further integrate the EU by expanding the capabilities of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Diplomatically, the CFSP and German security policy may frustrate United States leadership with its Eurocentric focus. By understanding the geopolitical history of the Bismarck era, Americans can better understand why Germany—and by association the EU—will focus on protecting Europe, and it will not see the inherent benefit in international engagements outside of the

¹⁶⁸ Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 8.

¹⁶⁹ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 109.

European area. A reflection of Bismarck's Africa comments can shed light on the foundations of Germany's current security policy focus.

The first article of the 2015 Munich Security Report calls on Germany to assume responsibilities respective to its great power status.¹⁷⁰ Abenheim and Halladay believe that this prototypical Western viewpoint lacks a developed understanding of the effect of the nation's lesson learned from its history.¹⁷¹ As noted above, the constraints of the defeat from World War II and the holocaust have lessened in the decade since 2003. Germany has established itself as a normal power, but collective memories remain a powerful force among the public. The guilt of the previous generation has been replaced with a feeling of victimhood by some in the current generation, and Kundnani asserts that "debates about German national identity were expressed through a competition between two specific collective memories: Auschwitz and Dresden."¹⁷² Germany's successful policy of reconciliation has subsided, and Berlin now touts its approach to foreign and security policy as a *normal* nation allowed to pursue its national interest, often ahead of public opinion.¹⁷³

German leadership has emerged to pursue its diplomacy not through the threat of military force, but with the weight of the financial and economic power of the European Union. Maintaining open lines of communication and reinforcing the integrity of the European Union will remain central to the security and defense policy of Germany, similar to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe that shaped the foreign policy of the Bismarck era. The German government's desire to retain its newly earned primacy in Europe will also oblige Germany to increase the capabilities and modernize the Bundeswehr into a credible expeditionary force. Increasing globalization and economic integration will compel Germany to place more focus on the ability to operate in areas outside of its typical range of military operations to protect the economic sources

¹⁷⁰ *Munich Security Report 2015*, 10.

¹⁷¹ Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, "Stability in Flux: Policy Strategy, and Institutions in Germany," from Bruneau, Thomas C., and Florina Cristiana Matei. *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-military Relations* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 304.

¹⁷² Kundnani, *Paradox*, 63.

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, 65.

of Germany's power base. This policy, of course, requires an investment of large sums of money redirected to the modernization of the Bundeswehr.

Offensive realism fails to fully explain Germany's position on foreign policy. Germany's pursuit for national interest cannot be divorced from its geopolitical position in Europe. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, historical adversaries geographically surround Germany on all sides without the benefit of Mearsheimer's concept of "the stopping power of water."¹⁷⁴ Hard lessons from the past have taught the Germans to respect their geopolitical realities and to seek security not through military action but instead through collective security arrangements like NATO and the EU.

Germany lacks a cohesive national security strategy, and the culture has left a debate concerning security policy small and quiet.¹⁷⁵ The current vulnerabilities exposed by the migrant crisis have pushed EU border protection to the forefront of security policy. The porous borders combined with the real threats of terrorism brought to light with the attacks in France in 2015, have touched on many of the key themes of the European security Strategy like terrorism and controlling large-scale migration flow to the EU.¹⁷⁶ Germany may have to move beyond its post-heroic quasi-pacifistic nature in order to save the European Union from a period of resurgent nationalism that threatens the hard won integration showcased in the Schengen Zone.¹⁷⁷

Miskimmon's comments of nations propensity to upload and download policies from the super international institution sheds light on how Germany uses the European Union to advance its foreign and security policy goals. In recent years Germany has been uploading many of its policies to the European Union, and then downloading may these policies on other European Union nations.¹⁷⁸ An example of this has been prevalent in

¹⁷⁴ Mearsheimer, *Tragedy*, 114.

¹⁷⁵ Barbara Kunz, "Defending Europe? A stocktaking of French and German visions For European defense," *European Defense*, IRSEM, Étude n° 41, September 2015, 20.de

¹⁷⁶ Gustav Lindstrom, "The European Security Strategy—The Way Ahead," in *The European Union – A Global Actor?* eds. Sven Gareis, Gunther Hauser & Franz Kernic, 56.

¹⁷⁷ Kaplan, *Revenge*, 151.

¹⁷⁸ Miskimmon, *Germany and CFSP*, 39.

the news, is the economic austerity policy that has been forced on Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. As long as the European Union survives, Germany plays the lead role in the direction of policy, but if the Union begins crumble Germany will seek to consolidate its regional hegemony.

During the 2015 Munich Security Conference, the German Minister of Defense claimed that Germany was ready to “lead from the centre.”¹⁷⁹ This thesis has determined that this represents a change in the direction of German foreign policy, but that this change has been part of an evolution of Germany from a defeated, occupied, and divided nation to the great power in the European Union. The years when Germany’s foreign policies were driven by influential leadership striving to reconcile the nation’s violent history have been replace by the drive to pursue national interests as a normal nation. The realities of external security threats to the European Union and the internal economic crises since the global financial collapse of 2008 have forced Germany to act more like the international relations theory of realism predicts. This shift has widened the gap between the German government’s ambitions to play a stronger role in global security and the continued domestic support for more civilian power. Helga Welsh, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University, comments that a “culture of restraint in military matters has infiltrated the attitudes and values of German elites and citizens, and life on the front line of the Cold War left its imprint.”¹⁸⁰ Kundnani further asserts that twenty years after reunification, “Never again War” has seemed to replace “Never again Auschwitz” as Germany’s guiding principle on the use of military force.¹⁸¹ As Germany faces a new set of leadership challenges, have the security policy decisions and goals from the past set Germany up to succeed?

Of course, some aspects of the past will be brought to bear against the current aspiration of German policy—like the *Der Spiegel* cover declaring “The German Übermacht” while displaying Chancellor Angela Merkel superimposed alongside Nazis

¹⁷⁹ Von der Leyen, “Leadership from the Centre.”

¹⁸⁰ Welsh, “Ascent,” 225.

¹⁸¹ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 69.

on top of the Acropolis in Athens in 1941.¹⁸² The magazine went to print amid the bilateral disaster of the Euro crisis and the austerity regime as Greece was claiming a right to war reparations from Nazi hostilities during the war. The difference was that these statements and attempts to link the past with present failed to garner the response that it may have received a decade earlier. The Germans maintained their position on austerity measures undeterred by attempts to sway public opinions with historical references to Nazi propaganda. Barbara Kunz of the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) admits, “the political price tag of deploying the Bundeswehr is high, and ethical considerations dominate the public debate surrounding them. In this context, and absent clearly defined German strategic interests, conflicts with allies, including France, often seem like the lesser evil.”¹⁸³

It is interesting to compare the differing geographies of the seven great powers: the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Germany.¹⁸⁴ Immediately one notices the limited access to the oceans that may limit a great power’s ability to utilize a large navy, such is the case for Germany. Germany has no history of the age of exploration, having not been unified until the mid-19th century. Furthermore, Germany is destined by geography to be a great land power. Once consolidated as one unified Germany, it forever changed the balance of power in Europe. Despite a devastating defeat in the first world war and a total defeat of the second world war, resulting occupation, accountability for a devastating genocide, and the division of the nation on two different sides of an idealistic Cold War Germany is once again united and once again considered the great power in Europe. History recounts that a nation cannot escape its geography, and Germany’s geographic position with no natural defensive borders in the center of Europe guides the nation’s view to both East and West. Germany has once again risen from the ashes like the mythical phoenix; hopefully this time, the

¹⁸² “The German Übermacht,” *der Spiegel*, Nr. 13 March 21, 2015.

¹⁸³ Kunz, “Defending Europe?,” 58

¹⁸⁴ Joshua S. Goldstein & Jon C. Pevehouse, *International Relations* 10th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2014), 54.

Germans returned to power will manifest itself benevolently instead of with instability and violence.

The fact that the list of the seven contemporary great power includes Germany explains a great deal why there is a request for Germany to take on a larger share of the global security role. Germany seems to recoil from out of area operations, and even when it does participate within a coalition framework—often the national caveats severely limit the potential effectiveness of the German forces.¹⁸⁵ Germany's emerging status as a reluctant hegemon in Europe—amid the waning power of the United Kingdom and France—places a responsibility to provide more for international security.¹⁸⁶ Nevertheless, the real danger for Germany is to let history constrain its emerging international power solely in the European region or without the benefit of a capable military force. The world order is changing, and Western power in the world may be in decline. At the very least, the United States will be heavily employed in the Middle East and the Far East to maintain its grip on vital sea lines of communication that account for a large percentage of its economy. The German's should heed the calls of the Western nations for it to take on more global responsibility by stepping out to lead from the front.

¹⁸⁵ Belkin, "Trends and Transatlantic Implications," 22.

¹⁸⁶ Kundnani, *Paradox*, 108.

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